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Frege’s theory of types
Bruno Bentzen
Abstract There is a widespread assumption in type theory that
the discipline begins with Russell’s efforts to resolve paradoxes
concerning the naive notion of a class. My aim in this paper
is to argue that Frege’s sharp distinction between terms denoting
objects and terms denoting functions on the basis of their saturation
anticipate a simple type theory, although Frege vacillates between
regarding functions as closed terms of a function type and open
terms formed under a hypothetical judgment. Frege fails to express
his logical views consistently due to his logicist ambitions, which
require him to endorse the view that value-ranges are objects.
1 Introduction
There is a widespread assumption in type theory that the
discipline begins with Russell’s efforts to resolve paradoxes
concerning the naive notion of a class since 1903. However, if by
a theory of types we understand a logical formalism where every
term must have a type and every operation must be restricted
to terms of a certain type, then it can be argued that Frege
anticipated much of a theory of types in his two-volume book
Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893/1903), which introduces the
mature version of the ideography that he intended to use as
a formal logical system to vindicate his longstanding logicist
claim that arithmetic is reducible to logic.
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2Of course, never once in his career did Frege advocate a
full-fledged doctrine of types, but his sharp distinction between
names of objects and names of functions leaves no doubt that
his ideography is always implicitly operating on typed terms,
for objects and functions form two disjoint categories of things.
For Frege, objects are saturated and complete, while functions
are unsaturated and in need of completion (Grundgesetze I §1).
This idea is better understood in the setting of a simple type
system with a ground type of individuals ι and a type former
for functions σ → τ , where σ and τ stand for types. The
requirement that every term definable in the theory must have
a unique type thus incorporates the principle that every term
either stands for an object or a function. Given that numbers,
truth values, and value-ranges do not exhibit saturation, they
cannot be viewed as functions, so, according to this dichotomy,
the only alternative left is to regard them as objects
Objects stand opposed to functions. Accordingly,
I count as an object everything that is not a
function, e.g., numbers, truth-values and the value-
ranges introduced below. Thus, names of objects,
the proper names, do not in themselves carry
argument places; like the objects themselves, they
are saturated. (Grundgesetze I §2)
Semantically, this dichotomy is reflected by a sharp distinction
between terms that are supposed to refer to objects and terms
that are supposed to refer to functions. For variables, Frege
determines whether they are intended to indicate an object or a
function using specific letter conventions, which are all different
for Roman, Greek, and Gothic letters. Ultimately, the type
inference is left to the reader and depends on the context, but
here are some common examples of his letter conventions:
• Roman object letter: a–e, i–l, n–z ;
• Greek object letter: α–ε, Γ–Ρ;
• Gothic object letter: a–e;
3• first-level Roman function letter: f–h, F–H ;
• first-level Greek function letter: Φ–Ψ;
• first-level Gothic function letter: f{h;
• second-level Roman function letter: M ;
• second-level Greek function letter: Ω.
The distinction between Roman, Greek, and Gothic marks is
equally essential to Frege’s theory of types since, as I will
describe in more detail in the next section, each kind of letter
has their own purpose in the ideography. Not only type
annotations are implicitly present in the ideography in the
form of metavariables ranging over types, but also operational
constraints that depend on the type assigned to a term.
Frege famously takes the notion of function as primitive,
viewing predicates and relations as functions that assign objects
to reified truth values and distinguishing between functions of
first and higher level depending on whether they only admit
object or functions of lower levels as arguments. That Frege
takes those constraints very seriously can be most readily seen
from his initial response to the discovery of Russell’s paradox,
where, in his first letter to Russell, he explains that the
circular expression “a predicate is predicated of itself” is not
an acceptable term in the ideography because a predicate is a
function of first level.1 More generally, if we adopt the usual
notation a : σ to express that a is a term of type σ, then it is easy
to see that for every term f : σ → τ , the function application
f(f) will always be ill-typed. Unfortunately, as value-ranges
are taken to be objects, self-application is completely able to
enter the ideography through the back door, compromising the
coherence of the whole type system of the ideography.
Even though there can be no doubt that Frege failed to
arrive at a consistent conception of type constraint, the fact
remains that many of his logical insights are still accepted
today since the development of Church’s simple type theory.
1 See Frege (1980, p.131–133).
4This point has been alluded to by some authors. In particular,
Quine (1940) has pointed out that Church revived Frege’s
conception of function abstraction and predicates with his
lambda abstraction and his treatment of predicates as functions
to the type of booleans.2 Later, Quine (1955) comes to
recognize Frege’s hierarchy of objects, functions of first level,
functions of second level and so forth as an anticipation, to
some degree, of the theory of types. Potts (1979) explores some
similarities and differences between the ideography and the
lambda calculus, and Klement (2003) adds detail and precision
to the comparison of the role played by value-range and lambda
terms in their respective systems, although major emphasis is
placed on the influence of Frege’s conception of value-ranges in
Russell’s early work. Simons (2019) examines Frege’s use of
double value-ranges to provide extensions for binary functions,
a technique known as currying in type theory. Despite that,
however, I believe Frege’s theory of types still has not received
the attention it deserves from type theorists, and it is far from
obvious how Frege’s logical views should be understood from a
modern type-theoretic perspective.
Indeed, what I hope to show in the present paper is that
more sense can be made of Frege’s theory of types than is
generally assumed in the type theory literature. In Section 2,
I claim that Frege’s conventional usage of Roman and Greek
marks allows him to distinguish between open and closed terms
in a robust way that resembles the type-theoretic distinction
between hypothetical and categorical judgments. In Section 3, I
investigate Frege’s conception of value-ranges as objects and his
anticipation of the lambda calculus, and I conclude that Frege’s
understanding of functions is based on a confusion between
open terms and closed terms of the function type. In Section 4,
I examine how the view that value-ranges are functions would
be in conflict with Frege’s conception of identity and his logicist
ambition of establishing numbers as logical objects.
2After the discovery by Howard (1980) of a correspondence between
propositions and types in the context of constructive logic, this approach
has been generalized, giving birth to type families, indexed families of types
that associate every term to a type.
52 Categorical and hypothetical judgments
The two forms of judgment that have become standard in
modern logic can be traced back to Frege’s ideography. First,
we have the usual judgment form that states that a proposition
is true, which he famously writes in a turnstile notation
A
and, second, we have the accompanying judgment form that
states that a sentence expresses a proposition, which is
initially proposed in the early version of the ideography in
Begriffsschrift through the notion of the content stroke
A
which characterizes a proposition as the content of a turnstile
judgment, that is, a “judgeable content”. The notion of content
was originally the main semantic unit of the ideography, and it
was not until after the distinction between sense and reference
that a proposition came to be explained as the sense or thought
of a sentence. That is, a sentence expresses a proposition and
refers to a truth value. When the theory of sense and reference
is formally incorporated into the ideography in Grundgesetze,
the turnstile judgment gets to be explained as the assertion
that a sentence refers to the true and the content stroke ends
up being treated as a function that refers to the true for the
true as argument and the false otherwise (the horizontal).
As a result, it is no longer possible to assert the fact that
a sentence expresses a proposition, which is to say that a term
expresses a thought, since the ideography does not have a
counterpart for the content stroke anymore. In practice, that
is achieved through the manipulation of functions into truth
values such as the horizontal, negation, identity, conditional,
and universal quantifier, which, when fully saturated, are
assumed to have a truth value as reference, therefore expressing
a thought. Since sentences are handled as terms that refer
to objects, and a sentence that refers to exactly one truth
6the ideography can be given by showing that every well-formed
term in the system has a unique reference. That is precisely
what Frege sets out to do in Grundgesetze I §§29-31. This is a
point that I shall return to later in this section.
2.1 Unsaturation and hypothetical judgments
The assertion of a turnstile judgment is commonly supported
by one or more implicit typing annotations, because the fact
that the proposition expressed by a particular sentence is true
often depends on assumptions that a letter occurring in the
sentence refers to an object or function. In order to ensure full
transparency with respect to the assumptions needed in the
assertion of a turnstile judgment such as
A Ą (B Ą A)
I shall write all typing assumptions as explicit hypotheses on
the left-hand side of the turnstile in a modern notation, where
a true indicates that a refers to the true
A : ι, B : ι ⊢ A Ą (B ⊃ A) true.
In fact, I shall be treating the relation a : σ and predicate a true
as forms of judgments as well, meaning that they may have
assertive force and can be subject to rules of inference. Thus,
to give an example, I may write
x : ι, f : ι→ ι ⊢ f(x) : ι
to express that f(x) is an object under the assumption that f
is a function and x is an object. In type theory, it is common
to refer to judgments made under typing assumptions such as
the last two illustrated above as hypothetical judgments and
judgments made under no typing assumptions such as the first
one above as categorical judgments.
Although it would not be wrong to say that Frege makes
extensive use of categorical judgments, it would seem that
when all the typing annotations of a claim are made explicit
in the way I just suggested very few categorical judgments
7can be found in the ideography. This indicates that most
judgments in the ideography are in effect hypothetical ones in
our sense, and, as a matter of fact, the notion of hypothetical
judgment is implied in the ideography through the adoption of
Roman letters since §1 of Grundgesetze I, where Frege speaks
repeatedly of the unsaturated nature of functions. In particular,
(2 + 3x2)x
cannot refer to an object, since, when we substitute the
numerals 0, 1, 2, and 3 for the argument place x, we obtain
terms referring to different objects, namely, the numbers 0,
5, 28, and 87, respectively. That is because (2 + 3x2)x is
an open rather than a closed term, that is, it is a term with
free occurrences of variables. I shall express this fact with the
hypothetical judgment
x : ι ⊢ (2 + 3x2)x : ι
that asserts that (2 + 3x2)x refers to an object provided that
x also refers to an object, or, what amounts to the same thing,
since every closed term is supposed to have a reference, that
(2 + 3x2)x is a closed object term for a closed object term x.
Every function term is unsaturated in the ideography, but
surprisingly not every unsaturated expression is accepted as
a function term. Perhaps the most straightforward way of
seeing this is by observing that every theorem in the ideography
is actually a schema formed by open sentences with free
occurrences of sentential variables. Curiously, Frege does not
view open terms as function terms because he does not accept
them as referential terms:
I shall call names only those signs or combinations
of signs that refer to something. Roman letters,
and combinations of signs in which those occur,
are thus not names as they merely indicate. A
combination of signs which contains Roman letters,
and which always results in a proper name when
every Roman letter is replaced by a name, I
8will call a Roman object-marker. In addition, a
combination of signs which contains Roman letters
and which always results in a function-name when
every Roman letter is replaced by a name, I will
call a Roman function-marker or Roman marker of
a function. (Grundgesetze I §17)
But he gives no reason as to why function terms are referential
and open terms are not, since, to the untrained eye, both seem
to be unsaturated expressions in the exact same way. The holes
in a function term (of first level) are marked using lowercase
Greek letters such as ξ or ζ while in an open term we always
have Roman letters playing the role. For Frege, however, open
terms only serve as indicators of objects. They are what he
calls “Roman marks”, unsaturated combination of signs that
result in a closed term when every Roman letter occurring in it
is replaced with a closed term. For an open term, the best we
can hope for is that a referential expression is achieved when all
their variables are instantiated with closed terms. On the other
hand, although Function terms are unsaturated, we can show
that they are referential if they always result in a referential
expression when properly applied to closed terms.
By arguing that function terms are unsaturated, Frege not
only creates an unnecessary distinction between two classes
of unsaturated expressions, but also commits himself to the
puzzling thesis that function terms behave like open terms
x : ι ⊢ f(x) : ι despite actually being closed terms of a function
type f : ι → ι. By “unsaturated expression” Frege seems to
mean an open term. I will come back to this discussion in
Section 3.3 after examining Frege’s conception of value-ranges
and his view of abstracted functions as saturated entities.
2.2 Saturation and categorical judgments
Although not a part of the referential terms of the language,
uppercase Greek letters are in sharp contrast with Roman
marks in that they are used as a stand-in for referential terms.
Heck (1997) views them as auxiliary names that are added to
the language subject to the condition that they must refer to
9some object in the domain. Instead of relying on an assignment
of values to free variables, as it common in modern logic since
the seminal work of Tarski, Frege makes use of auxiliary names
that are assumed only to refer to some object.
The supporting role of auxiliary names is most evident in
Frege’s proof of referentiality in §§29–31 of Grundgesetze I,
where he intends to show that every closed term of the
ideography is referential by arguing by induction on their
structure that f(ξ) is referential if f(∆) always has a reference
for every object term ∆ and that a is referential if Φ(a) always
has a reference for every function term Φ(ξ). Thus, Frege does
think of uppercase Greek letters as terms that are assumed to
have a reference, although not only in the domain of objects
but that of functions as well. In fact, since every closed term
is supposed to be referential, I believe the claim that ∆ is an
auxiliary name amounts to the hypothesis that it is closed term.
Therefore, in a turnstile judgment
∆ Ą (Γ Ą ∆)
consisting entirely of uppercase Greek letters such as ∆ and
Γ, what we actually have is a categorical judgment where every
auxiliary name is assumed to be closed, which is to say, in other
words, that, by hypothesis, they are assumed to be derivable
under no typing assumptions. The presuppositions involved in
the reasoning above can be expressed more accurately as an
inference where the notion of a closed term is made explicit
⊢ A : ι ⊢ B : ι
⊢ A Ą (B Ą A) true
.
In words, the inference above states that we are able to show
that the sentence A Ą (B Ą A) is true provided that we can
assert that A and B are closed object terms. When judgments
are represented in this way, as I shall do, we no longer have a
need to write auxiliary names as uppercase Greek letters.
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3 The doctrine of value-ranges
Considering that Frege is determined not to call into doubt
his distinction between objects and functions, to question
the premise that value-ranges are objects is to embrace the
apparently superfluous thesis that the resulting value-range
of a function is again a function. In the ideography, the
conception of value-ranges as objects can be expressed as the
requirement that that the value-range term ǫ`f(ǫ) refers to an
object for a function f , which, in our notation, can be more
easily articulated via the hypothetical judgment
f : ι→ ι ⊢ ǫ`f(ǫ) : ι. (1)
More precisely, value-ranges are regarded as first-class objects
obtained by function abstraction, which, in turn, are
incorporated as a function of second level which has the value-
range of a first-level unary function as value. In modern
terminology, we can think of the value-range ǫ`f(ǫ) as as the
graph of the function f(x) for an argument x.
3.1 Why we should not blame Basic law V
The notion of value-range is governed by Basic Law V, the
infamous axiom that states that the value-range of the function
f is the same as the value-range of the function g just in case
f and g have the same values for the same arguments
ǫ`f(ǫ) = α`g(α)↔ ∀(a)f(a) = g(a).
As I noted in the previous section, this is in fact an axiom
schema since the function letters f and g are open terms, so, to
begin with, we observe that we have a hypothetical judgment
f, g : ι→ ι ⊢ ǫ`f(ǫ) = α`g(α)↔ ∀(a)f(a) = g(a) true.
Not only Roman letters have implicit typing assumptions, and,
indeed, here we have another example with the Gothic letters
that are used to mark the variables bound by a quantifier. This
11
convention is patently clear in Grundgesetze I §20 where the
theorem given as
∀(f)(∀(a)f(a)) Ą f(x)
actually stands for the fully explicit theorem schema, which, for
convenience, I will henceforth write without Gothic letters,
x : ι ⊢ ∀(f : ι→ ι)(∀(a : ι)f(a)) Ą f(x) true
because x : ι and f(x) : ι can only mean that f : ι → ι. Now,
if we apply the same strategy to Basic Law V as well, we are
able to bring it to its definite form
f, g : ι→ ι ⊢ ǫ`f(ǫ) = α`g(α)↔ ∀(x : ι)f(x) = g(x) true.
On close inspection, one can see that there is one fundamental
assumption concerning the nature of value-ranges that is not
stated in this formulation, namely, the condition (1) that value-
ranges be objects. As it stands, there is nothing inherently
contradictory about Basic Law V per se and this is reflected
by the fact that this law has been rediscovered in type theory
under the name of function extensionality (see Section 4.1).
3.2 Currying and double value-ranges
On an equal footing with Frege’s classification between first
and higher level is his distinction between unary and binary
functions in the ideography. Clearly, unary functions can be
only possibly annotated as f : ι → ι, but how should we write
the type of a binary function? Binary functions act on a pair
of arguments but may also be partially saturated with a single
term, resulting in a unary function:
So far only functions with a single argument have
been talked about; but we can easily pass on to
functions with two arguments. These stand in need
of double completion insofar as a function with one
argument is obtained after their completion by one
12
argument has been effected. Only after yet another
completion do we arrive at an object, and this object
is then called the value of the function for the two
arguments. (Grundgesetze I §4)
This partial saturation creates some ambiguity in the
interpretation of function application and suggests that Frege
actually thinks of binary functions as unary functions from
objects to unary functions, an idea that was later on
rediscovered by Scho¨nfinkel (1924) and further developed in
Curry and Feys (1958). In other words, Frege was the first
to make use of the concept of currying, the idea in combinatory
logic, lambda calculus, and type theory that functions of
multiple arguments can be entirely dispensed with if we allow
functions to have other functions as values. Partial saturation
means that a binary function g actually has the type
g : ι→ (ι→ ι)
However, in general, a binary function may be partially
saturated in two different ways, and, to make the argument
order explicit, Frege always writes a binary function term g
as g(ξ, ζ) instead, meaning that, given a term a : ι, he can
indicate the two resulting unary functions as g(a, ζ) and g(ξ, a).
In the lambda calculus, the use of explicit argument-marks are
unnecessary because function abstraction leaves no room for
ambiguity in the determination of the arguments of a function,
and in this way the unary functions above may be represented as
λx.g(a)(x) and λx.g(x)(a), respectively. Simons (2019) explains
in detail that Frege’s ideography had a very similar feature for
handling application in curried functions with the use of the
double value-ranges introduced in Grundgesetze I §36. Since,
for instance, g(a, ζ) is a unary function, we can form its value-
range ǫ`g(a, ǫ) : ι. Now, by removing a : ι from this term, a term
formation method explained in §30, we can form a new unary
function ǫ`g(ζ, ǫ), whose value-range is α`ǫ`g(α, ǫ) : ι, the double
value-range of the binary function g(ξ, ζ).
In view of the fact that value-ranges are objects, it is not
possible to apply them to objects. Instead, Frege has a special
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purpose application function, introduced in §34, which is not a
built-in primitive operation on a par with the ordinary function
application, which from f : σ → τ and a : σ results in f(a) : τ ,
but, instead, is a definable binary function of the ideography,
derived using the definite description function of §11. I shall
write this application function as an open term
x, y : ι ⊢ x ∩ y : ι
in order to avoid the implicit convention of adopting lowercase
Greek letters for argument-places. Now, x ∩ y refers to f(x) if
y is a value-range ǫ`f(ǫ) and to the false otherwise.3 In fact, we
have an explicit equality that holds for value-ranges
f : ι→ ι, x : ι ⊢ x ∩ ǫ`f(ǫ) = f(x) true (2)
and, given that a double value-range is just a value-range with
a doubly-iterated function abstraction, for any binary function
g : ι→ (ι→ ι), and terms a, b : ι, the following equality holds
b ∩ a ∩ α`ǫ`g(α, ǫ) = b ∩ ǫ`g(a, ǫ)
= g(a, b).
This eliminates the ambiguity in the order of application of
a binary function, allowing Frege to explicitly differentiate
between the terms α`ǫ`g(α, ǫ) and α`ǫ`g(ǫ, α), which generally refer
to distinct objects when g is not commutative, since
b ∩ a ∩ α`ǫ`g(α, ǫ) = g(a, b) but b ∩ a ∩ α`ǫ`g(ǫ, α) = g(b, a).
There has been one instance, pointed out by Simons (2019),
where Frege articulates a notion of simultaneous application of
double value-ranges with ordered pairs. The idea is put forward
later in §144, together with the definition of a pairing function
x; y via application iteration as ǫ`(x ∩ y ∩ ǫ) so that
3Actually, when y is not a value-range, x ∩ y refers to the value-range
of a function whose value for every argument is the false, which, according
to the stipulations of §10 is the false itself (see Section 4.2).
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α`ǫ`g(α, ǫ) ∩ a; b = α`ǫ`g(α, ǫ) ∩ ǫ`(a ∩ b ∩ ǫ)
= b ∩ a ∩ α`ǫ`g(α, ǫ)
= b ∩ ǫ`g(a, ǫ)
= g(a, b).
In type theories with a product type σ × τ , whose terms are
ordered pairs (a, b) : σ × τ for a : σ and b : τ , currying is
commonly expressed as a logical equivalence between the types
σ × τ → υ and σ → (τ → υ), which states the existence of one
function that transforms a binary function into its curried form
and one function that takes a curried function and transforms
it back into its binary form. Frege’s conception of currying
could not possibly be better stated with his identification of
simultaneous and iterated applications, except that since x; y
is a value-range, ordered pairs are not terms of a product type.
They are objects like any others, and since a function f : ι→ ι
has to be defined for all objects (see Section 4.1), any such f
can take an ordered pair as argument and still be unary.
3.3 Frege’s simple type theory
Recall that the real purpose of the restrictions of a type system
is to ensure that operations are applied only to arguments
of the intended domain, making sure that well-typed terms
are always well-behaved in a certain sense. Given that every
well-formed term is well-typed and vice-versa, for Frege, good
behavior means that a term definable in the ideography is
referential, and, as mentioned in the previous section, Frege
goes to great lengths in Grundgesetze I §§29–31 to show that
this is the case. Unfortunately, his proof cannot go through due
to the contradictions found in the ideography, which, as noted
by Frege himself in his first letter to Russell (see footnote 1),
arises in the form of the self-application ǫ`f(ǫ) ∩ ǫ`f(ǫ) which
is coreferential with f(ǫ`f(ǫ)) for any f : ι → ι. Now, if
we instantiate the application theorem (2) with the function
¬x∩x and its corresponding value-range, we immediately arrive
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at a contradiction, a closed term of the form ¬a = a that
simultaneously refers to both the true and false.
It is therefore fair to assume that Frege’s theory of types
turned out to be inconsistent due to his flawed conception of
value-ranges as objects (1), which undermines all his efforts to
separate objects from functions. If the most prudent way out of
the contradiction is to view value-ranges not as objects but as
functions, the only problem is that value-ranges are themselves
determined by functions for Frege, so such a stipulation would
make the distinction between functions and value-ranges lose
its purpose:
f : ι→ ι ⊢ ǫ`f(ǫ) : ι→ ι
It was Church (1940) who first realized with his lambda calculus
how to adequately dissolve the dichotomy between functions
and value-ranges and capture Frege’s intuition that we form
value-ranges by abstraction on unsaturated expressions. The
idea simply involves a functional abstraction on open terms,
which are then regarded as closed function terms via the
introduction of an abstract binding operation that ranges over
all their free occurrences of variables. That is, instead of
abstracting functions to form saturated objects, we abstract
unsaturated objects to form functions. If we were to express
this view in a Fregean style, it would be as
x : ι ⊢ f(x) : ι
⊢ x`f(x) : ι→ ι
. (3)
Instead of Frege’s smooth-breathing, however, which is
recognized by Church (1942) himself as one of the precursors
of his lambda-notation, I shall stick to Church’s λx.f(x).
Moreover, as the explicit use of hypothetical judgments already
determines what variables an open term may depend on, (3)
has a certain redundancy which may be completely eliminated
by rephrasing it as
x : ι ⊢ f : ι
⊢ λx.f : ι→ ι
. (4)
16
As a result of the identification of value-ranges with
functions in the above sense, the ideography no longer would
need two distinct forms of function application, the primitive
f(x) for functions and the derived x ∩ f for value-ranges.
Instead, we need only one notion of application app(f, x), a
unifying operation that comes with the same typing structure
as f(x) in being restricted to a function and an object
f : ι→ ι, x : ι ⊢ app(f, x) : ι (5)
and that inherits, at the same time, the computation rule of
a∩ ǫ`f(ǫ) which in §34 is stipulated to denote the same as f(a),
as stated in (2). In the lambda calculus, this computation is
the so-called β-reduction rule, which roughly states that the
application of a lambda term to a closed term results in a
closed term where all occurrences of the abstracted variable
are replaced with the term applied
x : ι ⊢ f : ι ⊢ a : ι
⊢ app(λx.f, a) = f [a/x] : ι
(6)
Notice that this computation rule expresses the same idea as
Frege’s stipulation of §34, apart from the fact that it deals with
function rather than object terms. Even another main rule of
Church’s lambda calculus, α-conversion, the stipulation that
two lambda terms that use different variable names are still the
same, was already envisioned by Frege (1891), who famously
declares that we can write a function like ‘x2 − 4x’ as ‘y2 −
4y’ without altering its sense.4 For the sake of brevity, I shall
simply write f(x) for app(f, x).
Except by their restriction to the domain of the type of
individuals ι, the rules described here are all present in the
simple type theory of Church (1940), an extended version of
the lambda calculus with a type system composed of a type of
individuals, functions, and truth values. It is remarkable that
the two turning points that determine the success of Church’s
4I have stressed this point in Bentzen (forthcoming). For a more focused
investigation of Frege’s theory of sense and reference in the setting of type
theory see Martin-Lo¨f (2001) and Bentzen (2020b).
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approach over Frege’s are the ideas that (i) functions are formed
by abstraction on open terms, a requirement which, to some
extent, can be traced back to Frege, since, as it will be seen in
the remainder of this section, function terms are treated as if
they were open terms in the ideography, and that (ii) value-
range terms are function terms, meaning that value-ranges
should refer to functions. For now, I will defer the discussion
of this second point to the next section, where I explain how it
would go directly against Frege’s logicist agenda.
In addition to the α- and β-rules, I would like to consider
another important rule not found in Church (1940), but studied
extensively in Curry and Feys (1958). Considering that Frege’s
value-range terms are formed by abstraction on function rather
than open terms, one may argue that the direct representation
of the value-range ǫ`f(ǫ) should be the lambda-term λx.f(x),
where f is a function. However, if x does not occur in f , the
distinction between λx.f(x) and f turns out to be unnecessary
extensionally speaking, since both functions will have the same
value for the same arguments. This intuition is captured by the
rule known as η-reduction
f : ι→ ι ⊢ λx.f(x) = f : ι→ ι (7)
which was not originally included in the untyped lambda
calculus for the semantic reason that while the left side of the
equality is a function, the right side may not be in Church’s
intended interpretation (Curry and Feys, 1958, p.92). Clearly,
η-reduction cannot have a representation in the ideography,
because if value-ranges are objects, so it would not make sense
to ask whether they could be functions.
Since for Frege value-range terms always refer to objects
while for Church lambda terms should be interpreted as
functions, and, moreover, that for Frege function application
must result in an object while for Church functions are allowed
to be values, it can be argued, following Potts (1979), that their
approaches to function abstraction are fundamentally different.
I am inclined to disagree with Potts on this point, for I do not
see the two reasons given above as compelling motivations for
distinguishing value-range and lambda terms. I shall address
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the second reason first. As I have indicated in Section 3.2,
Frege’s binary functions are essentially of second level. Frege
even considers third-level functions in the ideography and, as
correctly pointed out by Quine (1955), the only reason why
Frege does not adopt a hierarchy of higher functions is because
he sees no need for it: his conception of value-ranges as objects
allows him to always reduce higher-level functions to objects.
Finally, Klement (2003) calls attention to the fact that Frege
has once entertained the idea of having a function abstraction
device for function terms in a letter to Russell of 13 November
1904, where Frege employs a rough-breathing notation ǫ´(ǫ2 = 1)
for the function term that he would otherwise write as ξ2 = 1:
But this notation would lead to the same difficulties
as my value-range notation and in addition to a new
one. For a range of values is supposedly an object
and its name a proper name; but ‘ǫ´(ǫ2 = 1)’ would
supposedly be a function name which would require
completion by a sign following it. ‘ǫ´(ǫ2 = 1)1’
would have the same meaning as ‘12 = 1’, and
accordingly, ‘ǫ´(ǫ2 = 1) Ą’ would have to have the
same meaning as ‘Ą2= 1’, which, however, would
be meaningless. ‘ǫ´(ǫ2 = 1)’ would be defined only in
connection with an argument sign following it, and
it would nevertheless be used without one; it would
be defined as a function sign and used as a proper
name, which will not do. (Frege, 1980, p.161–162).
Although Frege clearly anticipates the developments of lambda
calculus in this passage, he quickly abandons the proposal
of indicating function terms by abstraction because it would
be incompatible with his resolve that the nature of function
consists in its unsaturatedness. For him, it is possible to use
ǫ´(ǫ2 = 1) in isolation as an object term because it has no
occurrences of argument-places while ξ2 = 1 is a proper function
term because the expression itself requires completion.
Put differently, in the quotation above Frege suggests that
function terms must be unsaturated because they are formed by
incomplete expressions and I believe that this leaves no grounds
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for doubt that he completely confuses function terms f : ι→ ι
with open terms x : ι ⊢ f(x) : ι. If we think of Frege’s function
terms as open terms, whose argument-places are specified as
typing assumptions, then the terms that should be assigned
to the function type are his value-range terms, when properly
reinterpreted as lambda terms in the sense described earlier.
It would seem to me that this confusion is one of the factors
that motivates Frege to make the bold claim that value-ranges
are objects (but see the Section 4.2). On the other hand,
I should mention that this reading of Frege’s function terms
as open terms is not fully consistent with all the aspects of
the ideography I have discussed so far. In particular, Frege’s
account of functions of second and third level is not amenable to
this interpretation, since open terms, which are represented as
hypothetical judgments, cannot be part of other hypothetical
judgments in any way.5 In the final analysis, it seems that
Frege vacillates between the treatment of function terms as open
terms and closed terms of a function type.
4 Why value-ranges cannot be objects
Finally, before I conclude, I would like to discuss what I see
as the main reason why Frege could not endorse the view that
value-ranges are functions, an observation that goes beyond his
conviction that value-range terms are saturated. Of relevance to
this is Frege’s conception of identity as a first-level relation, his
lack of a direct identity criterion for functions, and conviction
that no identity statements can ever be made about functions.
4.1 Identity is a first-level relation
Frege is known for conceiving identity as an all-inclusive relation
in the domain of all objects, or, more precisely, for holding
that an identity statement can be formed for any two objects
terms in the ideography. This happens to be a generalization
5But note that in (4) I rendered function abstraction, a second-level
function, as an inference rule that takes an open term to a closed term.
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of his principle of complete determination that the definition of
a predicate must say whether it is true or false for all objects.
In Grundgesetze II §65, Frege is clear that this principle of
complete determination is expressed by the requirement that
every function term must have a reference. It goes without
saying that this applies to the identity function as well
x, y : ι ⊢ x = y : ι
Frege’s criterion of referentiality of Grundgesetze I §29 states
that to determine the reference of a function term x : ι ⊢ f : ι
is to determine the reference of f(a) : ι for a closed a : ι.6
More precisely, to determine the reference of this function term,
which is in fact a binary relation, it suffices to determine the
truth value of a = b for any two closed terms a, b : ι.
That identity is restricted to the domain of objects is very
clearly expressed in Frege’s writings. Bearing in mind that
one should never be allowed to speak of two functions as being
the same according to Frege, when a mathematician expresses
the view that two functions are identical he or she is, strictly
speaking, incurring in a type mismatch error. Actually, what
he or she should have in mind is the idea of two functions
being coextensional, as noted in Ruffino (2003), which we may
articulate as the fact that f and g always have the same value
for the same arguments, that is, in the form of the first-level
relation of pointwise function equality. Still, since the two
halves of Basic Law V are taken to express the same sense, but
in a different way (Frege, 1891, p.27), and the value-range of a
function is an object, its graph, we can express coextensionality
more directly in first-order terms via function abstraction, as
an identity statement between the value-ranges of f and g.
As a matter of fact, even when Frege seems to be explicitly
speaking of an identity criterion for functions he recognizes it
as a relation of second level that must be distinguished from
6The same strategy appears in Martin-Lo¨f’s (1982) meaning explana-
tions of the hypothetical judgments of his type theory, but it is unclear
whether it was inspired by Frege’s approach. Either way, this puts more
weight to my allegation that Frege mistreats function terms as open terms.
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the usual identity of objects. In his posthumous comments on
sense and reference, written between 1892 and 1895, he makes
this point very clear, adding that such a second-level relation
expresses the same sense as pointwise function equality:
For every argument the function x2 = 1 has the
same (truth-) value as the function (x + 1)2 =
2(x + 1) i.e. every object falling under the concept
less by 1 than a number whose square is equal to its
double falls under the concept square root of 1 and
conversely. If we expressed this thought in the way
that we gave above, we should have
α2 = 1
α
≍ (α+ 1)2 = 2(α + 1)
What we would have here is that second level
relation which corresponds to, but should not
be confused with, equality (complete coincidence)
between objects. If we write it ∀(a)(a2 = 1) =
(a + 1)2 = 2(a + 1), we have expressed what
is essentially the same thought, construed as an
equation between values of functions that holds
generally. (Frege, 1979, p.121)7
Put another way, this means that Frege’s second-level relation
term for function correspondence f(α)
α
≍ g(α) expresses, via
Basic Law V, the same sense as the first-level identity statement
between value-range terms ǫ`f(ǫ) = α`g(α). Here we see that the
conception of value-ranges as objects is used in a crucial way
as a technical device to escape the restriction that one is not
allowed to speak of identical functions.
Notice that if we were to follow the developments of the
previous section of using lambda terms for value-range terms
then we would have to make some adjustments to Basic Law V
accordingly, as we would have an illegitimate identity statement
7It is believed that Frege’s explanation of this new notation was given
in the lost first part of the manuscript (see Frege (1979, p.121, fn.1)). I
took the liberty to modernize Frege’s quantifier notation.
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holding between two functions on the left-hand side of the
equivalence, either as
f, g : ι→ ι ⊢ λx.f(x) = λy.g(y)↔ ∀(x : ι)f(x) = g(x) true
or, equivalently, in the presence of η-reduction, as
f, g : ι→ ι ⊢ f = g ↔ ∀(x : ι)f(x) = g(x) true.
The latter principle is known as function extensionality in
dependent type theory, and, as it can be seen, it is nothing
more than a paraphrase of Basic Law V. Dependent type
theory is flavor of type theory developed by Martin-Lo¨f (1975)
that extends simple type theory with the introduction of
dependent types, a concept that allows for an elegant treatment
of quantifiers and identity, and universe types, types whose
terms are themselves types. Identity is conceived as a sortal
relation that is limited to two terms of a same type. Comparing
incomparables is not allowed, for it does not make sense to ask
whether two terms of a different type are equal. Actually, just as
envisaged by Frege, identity of objects and identity of functions
are regarded as different relations. The difference is that in
dependent type theory no identity relation is taken to be more
fundamental than the other.8
But it must be emphasized that in the ideography there
is no sortal identity and a first-level relation of sameness
cannot be confused with a second-level one. Although the
above formulation of function extensionality is meaningless
for Frege, we can certainly avoid the so-to-speak fallacious
identity statement f = g on its left-hand side if we state
8Surprisingly, many forms of dependent type theory are unable to
prove function extensionality, even though the principle is validated by
its intended semantics, the meaning explanations (Bentzen, forthcoming).
Homotopy type theory (UFP, 2013) has been gaining acceptance as a
foundational language for mathematics strong enough for proving not
only function extensionality but also that isomorphic objects are equal.
However, as the theory has to abandon the meaning explanations as its
informal interpretation, its philosophical coherence is open to question
(Ladyman and Presnell, 2016; Bentzen, 2020a).
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the principle in terms of the second-level relation expression
f(α)
α
≍ g(α) instead, which, is not only co-referential but has
the same sense as the pointwise function equality statement
∀(x : ι)f(x) = g(x). Since there is no violation of the principle
that identity is a first-order relation, it is fair to regard this
principle as Frege’s conception of function extensionality.
4.2 Two problems of identity
For Frege, numbers are extensions of concepts, a supposedly
logical conception of class defined as value-ranges of predicates.
Indeed, recall that Frege’s whole program presupposes the
derivation of the concept of number from purely logical means.
This definition is first envisaged in §68 of Grundlagen, Frege’s
philosophical masterpiece, but only after his proposal of two
well-known tentative definitions. His first definitional attempt
is not seriously considered, and appears to serve only to
motivate his claim that numbers are self-subsistent objects.
In contrast, there is no denying that Frege does seem to
struggle to establish the legitimacy of his second attempt, a
contextual definition via the so-called Hume’s Principle, that
says that the number that falls under the predicate f is equal
to the number that falls under the predicate g iff f and g are
in one-to-one correspondence, a relation of second level that is
sketched informally in §§71–72 of Grundlagen. We thus have
#xf(x) = #xg(x)↔ f ≈ g. (HP)
Frege eventually rejects this tentative definition because it does
not rule out the possibility of Julius Caesar being a number, and
I have argued elsewhere that this strange objection is raised for
the reason that it cannot ensure our epistemic grip on numbers
as logical objects (Bentzen, 2019). Surely, it can hardly be
argued that Hume’s Principle is a candidate logical law and, in
a letter to Russell of 28 July 1902, Frege expressly states that
he sees the notion of value-range as the only possible foundation
for our apprehension of logical objects:
I myself was long reluctant to recognize value-ranges
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and hence classes; but I saw no other possibility of
placing arithmetic on a logical foundation. But the
question is, how do we apprehend logical objects?
And I have found no other answer to it than this, we
apprehend them as extensions of concepts, or more
generally, as value-ranges of functions. (Frege, 1980,
pp. 140–141)
Frege’s transsortal identification of truth values with value-
ranges proposed in Grundgesetze I §10, one of the most
extensively studied sections of the book, makes it clear that
in his view value-ranges are the fundamental logical objects
that populate the universe of arithmetic. To resolve a
referential indeterminacy affecting the notion of value-range,
Frege stipulates that the true is equal to the value-range of a
function that always has the true as value for every argument
and a similar specification is given for the false.
This is a curious section that has caused considerable
confusion among Frege scholars because the Julius Caesar
objection is generally regarded as the semantic problem that
Hume’s Principle does not determine the truth value of mixed-
identity statements of the form #xf(x) = a. This common
interpretation of the Julius Caesar objection, however, is
incapable of explaining why, in §10, when a similar problem
of indeterminacy is encountered, now with respect to Basic
Law V and the reference of mixed-identity statements of the
form ǫ`f(ǫ) = a, which means that their truth value is yet
to be decided, Frege feels entitled to restrict his solution to
the domain of logical objects with his stipulation that some
truth values are value-ranges, completely ignoring the question
of whether a value-range could be identical to an urelement.
This dilemma can be resolved by noting that, since the
Julius Caesar objection in Grundlagen just calls into question
whether Hume’s Principle succeeds in establishing beyond all
doubt that we apprehend numbers are logical objects, once
value-ranges are already accepted as logical objects, there is
no need to worry about urelements anymore. All that we need
to do is to determine the reference of the function ǫ`f(ǫ) = x,
and, according to §29, to do so is to determine the truth value of
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the closed sentence ǫ`f(ǫ) = a for every closed term a : ι. Seeing
that, prior to the transsortal identification of §10, every closed
object term in the ideography is supposed to refer to either a
value-range or truth value, and Basic Law V already takes care
of value-range terms, it is enough to decide whether ǫ`f(ǫ) = a
is true or false for a closed sentence a : ι.
The position that value-ranges are functions may be able
to prevent the occurrence of paradox threats in the ideography
and, considering that it is founded on the assumption that we
perform function abstraction on open terms, it may even be
in line with Frege’s tendency to consider his function terms as
open terms, as I have already mentioned. Still, this position
would be of no use to Frege. More than anything else, Frege
felt he had to commit himself to the existence of value-ranges in
order to define numbers logically and make his logicist program
plausible, but to conform to his thesis that numbers are objects,
value-ranges have to be objects as well. Frege came remarkably
close to the formulation of simple type theory as we know it, but
in the end he failed to express his theory of types consistently
due to his logicist ambitions.
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